Time and hubris have caught up with an SNP that became entitled and self-deluded

The SNP learned long ago that it could not rely solely on support for independence to become Scotland’s largest party. Over many decades its election slogans were remarkably coy about independence: ‘Put Scotland First’, ‘Good for Scotland’, ‘We Stand for Scotland’, ‘Let’s Make Scotland Matter’, ‘Elect a Local Champion’, ‘Yes We Can’, ’Stronger for Scotland’, ‘A Future Made in Scotland’.

It made sense. Independence provided the SNP with its core support but that was insufficient to enable it to become Scotland’s largest party until a decade ago. The core were classic nationalists with a clear and simple belief: Scotland is a nation, therefore it should be a state. This core would never admit, to themselves or anyone else, that Scotland would be worse off independent.

It would possibly be conceded that independence might involve a painful transition, but it would be worth it. The poet Hugh MacDiarmid summed up this belief best: For we ha’e faith/In Scotland’s hidden poo’ers/The present’s theirs/But a’ the past and future’s oors.  

The SNP needed to appeal beyond the faithful. Hence the election slogans. The SNP consistently scored well in ‘Standing up for Scotland’, but that too was not enough. Devolution offered the vital opportunity. The nationalists sought to add to its core with instrumental support by proving they could govern competently, which, its leadership believed, would then be translated into support for independence.

But first it had to win an election. The SNP scraped into office in 2007 because enough voters were willing to give it a chance. Its opponents had long argued that an SNP government would focus exclusively on independence, constantly battle with London, and have little interest in public services. As a consequence, unionist opponents lowered expectations to subterranean levels of the SNP in office. All the SNP needed to be was moderately competent, avoid obsessing about independence, and not pick fights with London. From 2007 to 2011, the Salmond government exuded confidence, co-operation and competence.

Consequently, the constitutional question declined as the most important issue between 2007 and 2011 from 26 per cent to 15 per cent and support for independence flatlined. When offered three options in 2011, only 24 per cent of Scots supported independence. The status quo and more powers each had just under 40 per cent. But David Cameron’s insistence on a binary choice in the 2014 independence referendum was a gift to the SNP. The battle was on for those whose first preference was unavailable.

The SNP knew that a classic nationalist campaign would be insufficient. It claimed that independence would deliver a fairer, more prosperous, greener Scotland (the message tailored to whichever audience was being addressed) in contrast with the continuation of Tory misrule and austerity. Instrumental arguments were deployed to supplement core nationalist support.

The SNP conveyed optimism and hope in a campaign viewed by most voters as positive, though in reality it was one laced with negativity. One of its most successful messages came towards the end of the campaign, when it suggested that the NHS was in jeopardy under the union.

The intensity and duration of the referendum campaign created momentum that carried through to the 2015 general election. The SNP made the mistake of taking its vote and support for independence for granted. Energy and resources were poured into channelling post-referendum euphoria into support for an insecure leader rather than consolidating and building on what her predecessor had achieved. It misread evidence showing that younger voters were much more likely to support independence than older voters. I’ve got time on my side was the hubristic view of a leader drunk on the manufactured adulation of the faithful. And in the process the SNP forgot a basic lesson in politics: what goes up can come down.

The signs that all was not well were ignored, hidden and denied. The loss of members, and the likelihood is that they had always been inflated, ought to have been a warning. The leadership did nothing to discourage the abuse of journalists who dared raise questions.

The SNP’s message became more negative, returning to the debilitating politics of grievance and blame games. It looked for opportunities to fight with London, aided by a Tory government that saw benefits in playing up the SNP threat. The SNP failed to appreciate that a reputation for competence has to be constantly renewed. The instrumental support was soft and, quite probably reluctantly, drifting away.

The poor record in government appears to have had little impact on support for independence, but behind headline support lies evidence that independence support is ebbing away. The changing electorate over the last decade has not paid the predicted dividends.

Many who say they would vote for independence do not want another referendum in the near or foreseeable future. Some may be rational nationalists who know victory is unlikely, but others are likely taking the first step away from independence, using opinion polls to register general protest.

Time and hubris have caught up with an SNP that had become entitled and self-deluded.